Physician Incentive Programs: Is it Possible to Develop Incentive Programs that Provide Financial Incentives for Primary Care Physicians while Balancing Quailty Medicine and Utilization Controls? by Jones, Candace
PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PROGRAMS:
Is it possible to develop incentive programs that provide financial incentives for 
primary care physicians while balancing quality medicine and utilization controls?
By
Candace Jones
Presented to the Public Administration Faculty 
at the University of Michigan -  Flint 
in partial fulfillment of requirements for the 
Master of Public Administration
December, 2001
First Reader
istine Mulh
Second Reader
Dr. Mark Perry
Dedication
I would like to express my heartfelt thanks and appreciation to my family for the time, 
patience and assistance they provided me throughout my masters program. I attribute the 
successful completion of my masters program to their constant support and 
encouragement. Also, to Dr. Kristine Mulhom and Dr. Mark Perry for their review, 
advice and guidance through out this project. To Mr. Paul Garson for his encouragement, 
guidance and support to begin and finish this endeavor.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page N um ber
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Problem/ Issues............................................................................................................................2-3
Operational Definitions.............................................................................................................. 4-6
Timeline for Managed Care and National Standards............................................................ 7-9
Quality Measurement............................................................................................................. 10-11
Literature Review.................................................................................................................... 12-27
A. Impact o f Increased Competition on Quality o f Care............................. 12-14
B. Relationship o f Physician Payment Method on Quality o f Care.......... 15-20
C. Managed Care Techniques and Quality o f Care
1. Gatekeeper...................................................................................................21
2. Disease Management................................................................................. 22
3. Risk Adjustment................................................................................... 23-24
4. Physician Perception of Utilization Controls...................................24-26
Hypothesis...................................................................................................................................... 28
Methodology............................................................................................................................ 28-29
Studies and Findings o f Quality Incentive Programs
A. Literature...............................................................................................................32
B. Program 1 -  Health Maintenance Grids...........................................................35
C. Program 2 -  Physician Recognition Program...........................................37-40
Discussion.................................................................................................................................41-46
Conclusion................................................................................................................................47-50
References.......................................................................................................................................51
Appendix
I. Pediatric Health Maintenance Grid...................................................................52
II. Adolescent Health Maintenance G rid ...............................................................53
III. Young Adult Health Maintenance Grid............................................................54
IV. Adult Health Maintenance Grid........................................................................ 55
V. Adult Health Maintenance Grid -  Ages 65+...................................................56
VI. 1999 Performance Recognition Program Results......................................57-59
VII. 2000 Performance Recognition Program Results.................................... 60-62
INTRODUCTION
Health care costs in the United States have risen drastically in the last thirty years. 
The rise in health care costs started in the 1960s with the introduction of Medicare and 
Medicaid programs. By the 1970s, healthcare expenditures were increasing at an alarming 
rate, and became a major concern for reform. President Nixon called on experts to 
reorganize health care to include health maintenance organizations (HMO). The Nixon 
administration argued that HMOs increase the value of services a consumer receives for each 
healthcare dollar. Finally, by December 1973, the HMO Act was adopted. The main 
purpose of the HMO Act was to create a competitive market for healthcare with the aim of 
solving the problem of rising health care costs with an emphasis on maintenance of health 
through prevention and education.
Health Maintenance Organizations have grown in popularity since the 1970’s with 
enrollment in the United States increasing from approximately six million in the mid- 1970s 
to more than fifty million in 1995.1 The years prior to 1987 saw rapid expansion in the 
number of HMOs followed by industry consolidation, and since 1993 expansion again in the 
number of HMOs.
Cost has become a very important factor in the health care system. There is only x 
amount of dollars allocated for health care, thus the need for a check and balance process in 
managed care organizations. Cost-efficient medical care can enhance the population’s health 
by eliminating duplication of services and directing patient care to an appropriate medical 
service level. Reducing medical costs reduces premiums, enabling the allocation of more 
resources to those that need it most thereby increasing access to health care. Additional 
medical resources allocated to preventative medicine should also improve the quality of 
medical care delivered in the community over the long run. However, there is a line beyond
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which health maintenance organizations (HMOs) can contractually deliver to the patient 
without causing a conflict of interest.
PROBLEM/ ISSUE
Managed care organizations have focused on utilization controls through the use of 
managed care techniques as a manner of containing costs. Managed care techniques such as 
selective contracting, risk sharing and risk adjustment, gatekeepers, medical management and 
utilization review have presented a more measurable means of financially incentivizing the 
primary care physician. However, has the focus on utilization controls been at the expense of 
practicing quality care medicine?
Compensation that rewards physicians for withholding care can interfere with 
physicians’ loyalty to patients and ultimately their candor and trust. Structural incentives to 
reduce cost can be effective if they are not so direct and substantial to influen ce medical 
decisions. Thoughtful incentive structures can use measures of quality and patient 
satisfaction instead of rewarding less costly treatment decisions. How do we develop and 
balance these incentive structures and what other issues need to be taken into consideration?
Thus, in order to find a solution for such a complex issue, the complexity needs to be 
analyzed and defined. My research will utilize information already available on utilization 
controls and quality incentives to help better understand the existing relationships and 
structure. Additionally, my research will include gathering and analyzing data on two 
existing quality incentive programs to determine the effectiveness of using financial 
incentives for practicing quality medicine. The findings of this research will provide health 
care administrators with a cost / benefit analysis of the development of similar and more 
extensive models.
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Major questions related to the development of quality incentive programs
1. How does the payment method for physician services impact the quality of care 
delivered?
2. What do we know about the relationship between managed care techniques and 
quality of care?
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OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
Budgeted Capitation -  Arrangement where provider accrues a budgeted captitation per 
member per month (pmpm) but receives fee-for-service (FFS) payments that are applied 
against the “budget”.
Capitation -  A per-member, monthly payment to a provider that covers contracted services, 
and are paid in advance of the delivery of the service. In essence, a provider agrees to 
provide specified services to HMO members for this fixed, predetermined payment for a 
specified length of time (usually a year), regardless of how many times the member uses the 
service.
Case Management -  The comprehensive management of a member’s health problems 
wherein the chronically ill or otherwise impaired individual may require long term and/or 
costly care.
Catastrophic Threshold -  A pre-determined amount of fee for service payments that when 
reached (per member per year), changes the risk arrangement between the providers and the 
plan.
Concurrent Review -  A method of reviewing patient care, during hospital confinement, to 
validate the necessity of current care and to explore alternatives to inpatient care.
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Days Per Thousand (per 1000) -  A measurement of the number of days of hospital care 
used in a year per 1,000 HMO members.
Fee-For-Service (FFS) -  A system of payment for health care whereby a fee is rendered for 
each service delivered. This traditional method contrasts with that used in the prepaid sector 
where services are covered by a fixed payment made in advance that is independent of the 
number of services rendered.
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) -  The agency within the Department of 
Health and Human Services which administers federal health financing and related regulatory 
programs, principally the Medicare, Medicaid, and Peer Review Organization.
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) -  A legal corporation that offers health 
insurance and medical care. HMOs typically offer a range of health care services at a fixed 
price. Types of HMOs:
• Staff Model -  Organization owns its clinics and employs its doctors.
• Group Model -  Contract with medical groups for services.
• IPA Model -  Contract with an IPA that in turn contracts with individual 
physicians.
• Direct Contract Model -  Contracts directly with individual physicians.
• Mixed Model -  Members get options ranging from staff to IPA models.
Managed Care -  A relatively new term coined originally to refer to the prepaid health care 
sector where care is provided under a fixed budget and costs are therein capable of being
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“managed”. Increasingly, the term is being used by many analysts to include Preferred 
Provider Organizations (PPO) and even forms of indemnity insurance coverage that 
incorporate preadmission certification and other utilization controls.
Member Months -  A unit of measurement that counts the number of months a member is 
assigned to a primary care physician (a member for 12 months would have 12 member 
months).
Per Member Per Month (PMPM) -  A measurement of any kind that is calculated by taking 
the total (revenue, expenses) and dividing by member months.
Physician Hospital Organization (PHO) - It is owned jointly by a hospital and a physician 
group. The PHO, in turn, contracts with hospitals and physicians for the delivery of services 
to payers under contract to the PHO.
Stop-loss -  The practice of an HMO or insurance company of protecting itself or its 
contracted medical groups against part or all losses above a specified dollar amount incurred 
in the process o f caring for its policy holders.
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TIMELINE FOR MANAGED CARE AND NATIONAL STANDARDS
HMO
In December 1973, the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act was adopted. 
Health Maintenance Organizations were given legal recognition by the Public Health Service 
Act, Amendment Title XIII -  Health Maintenance Organizations, also known as the Health 
Maintenance Act of 1973. The HMO Act authorized expenditures of federal dollars, for the 
purpose of providing assistance and encouragement for the establishment of HMOs. 
Subsequent amendments to this act were Health Maintenance Organizations Amendments of 
1976, Health Maintenance Organizations Amendments of 1978, and Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation’s Act of 1981. Since 1986, growth in HMO enrollment has been 
considerable, both nationally and under Medicare.
JCAHO
Since 1951, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has
been evaluating and accrediting over 19,000 healthcare organizations and programs in the
United States. JCAHO is an independent not-for-profit organization and is the nations’
predominant standards setting and accrediting body in healthcare. Joint Commission has
developed state of the art, professionally based standards and evaluated the compliance of
healthcare organizations against these benchmarks. The Joint Commission evaluates and
accredits services for the following types of organizations: hospitals, healthcare networks,
home care organizations; long-term care facilities, assisted living, behavioral healthcare,
ambulatory care and clinical laboratories.
Accreditation by Joint Commission is recognized nationwide as a symbol of quality
that indicates an organization meets certain performance standards. To earn and maintain
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accreditation an organization must undergo an on-site survey by a Joint Commission survey 
team at least every three years.
In 1997, Joint Commission launched ORYX (outcome results) to integrate the use of 
outcomes and other performance measures into the accreditation process. Requirements for 
ambulatory care organizations and long-term care facilities under ORYX have not yet been 
established.
NCQA
The National Committee on Quality Assurance was established in 1990 as an 
independent not-for-profit organization based in Washington D.C. The NCQA has worked 
with consumers, healthcare purchasers, state regulators and the managed care industry in 
developing standards that evaluate the structure and function of medical and quality 
management systems in managed care organizations.
NCQA’s standards for accreditation of managed care organizations evaluate a 
managed care plan’s performance in the areas of quality management and improvement, 
utilization management, credentialing, members’ rights and responsibilities, preventative 
health services and medical record keeping. NCQA Accreditation is an example of a 
managed care organizations commitment to principles of quality and continuously improving 
the clinical care and services it provides.
HEDIS
In 1992, NCQA took over responsibility for the management and evolution of the 
Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), a performance measurement tool 
initially developed by The HMO Group. HEDIS is a set of standardized performance
measures designed to ensure that purchasers and consumers have the information they need 
to reliably compare the performance of managed health care plans. The performance 
measures in HEDIS are related to many significant public health issues such as cancer, heart 
disease, smoking and childhood immunizations. HEDIS also includes a standardized survey 
of consumers’ experiences that evaluates plan performance in areas such as customer service, 
access to care and claims processing. HEDIS is sponsored, supported and maintained by 
NCQA
In 1997, NCQA released its first annual addition of The State o f  Managed Care 
Quality -  Quality Compass, 1997. Quality Compass uses only standardized, independently 
audited information from NCQA’s Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) 
and offers an overview of the performance of the nations HMOs.
HCFA
On March 27, 1996, Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) issued the final 
rule on requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations.
The regulations govern physician incentive plans operated by federally qualified health 
maintenance organizations and competitive medical plans contracting with the Medicare 
program, and certain health maintenance organizations and health insuring organizations 
contracting with the Medicaid program. The regulations were effective January 1, 1997.
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QUALITY MEASUREMENT
To define quality, one needs to examine both health policy and health economics. 
Over the past decade, health policy has emphasized the importance of improving outcomes 
desired by consumers, as well as the challenge of distinguishing the effect of the medical care 
process from the many other factors that influence outcomes. Health policy organizations 
have defined the quality of medical care as the degree to which health care increases the 
probability of outcomes desired by consumers given current medical knowledge.2 Some of 
the health economics literature has similarly identified quality with a greater intensity of 
treatment such as the length of time spent with a physician during an office visit, number of 
visits per episode of illness. However, other analyses have recognized that more care is not 
necessarily better or worse.
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) defines quality of care as “the degree to which 
health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health 
outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge”2
The literature therefore implies that “quality of care is measured by the production of 
improved health of a patient after adjustments for the constraints of existing technology and 
severity of the patients illness. Avedis Donabedian describes three sources of data for 
measuring quality of healthcare: Structure, Process and Outcome (SPO) (Donabedian, 1980, 
p. 82-86). Structural data describes features of healthcare facilities, equipment, professional 
and nonprofessional staff and organizations for delivery of care. Process data describes the 
things actually done to or for a patient. Outcome data describes the change in health status of 
a patient that is attributable to healthcare.3
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For purposes of this research and my organization (a large PHO), we will utilize the 
Institute of Medicine’s definition measured against the desired clinical outcomes as 
established by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA). Additionally, my 
research will include data from The State of Managed Care - Quality Compass, 1999 and 
Quality Compass, 2000. The NCQA’s Compass 1999 and 2000 contain information on 
clinical performance, accreditation and member satisfaction. It also uses only standardized, 
independently audited information from HEDIS and includes results on the performance 
(averages, benchmarks & specific measures of care and service) of the nation’s HMOs. The 
report tells us that the good news is managed care quality is improving, at least in those 
health plans that are willing to release their results.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Impact of Increased Competition on Quality of Care
Numerous studies have been conducted to assess the growth of HMOs and their 
impact on health care costs and quality care. A survey of recent studies by Robert H. Miller 
and Harold S. Luft entitled “Does Managed Care Lead To Better Or Worse Quality Of 
Care?” reviewed the quality of care rendered by HMOs compared with the traditional system. 
It is equally important to look at the financial relationship between the primary care physician 
and the HMO and what implications that arrangement may have on quality care. My 
research will look at existing relationships and attempt to assess whether those relationships 
steer physician behavior. Additionally, the research will examine the current incentives or 
dis-incentives and build upon them or develop new incentives for primary care physicians.
The goal behind the development of the HMO was to form an alternative form of 
health care that focused on the maintenance of health through prevention and education. The 
theory is that future medical problems can be avoided or reduced by practicing preventative 
medicine. Additionally, reducing the impact of future medical problems may help decrease 
overall health care costs. If the HMO is unable to decrease costs because of additional 
preventative expenses, hopefully the process will at least improve the overall health of the 
community. In a health maintenance organization, the member must choose a primary care 
physician, who agrees to manage all of the members’ health care needs. The physician will 
act as a “gatekeeper” for services including the necessity of referring patients to specialists 
and hospitalization.
The growth in health maintenance organizations during the period between 1992
and 1996 seems, in part, to have eased the increase in health care spending. As HMO
enrollment and growth increased, market penetration increased and, over the past decade, the
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number of physicians employed by HMOs or at least contracted with health maintenance 
organizations increased. HMO market structure is based on the interaction of HMO 
penetration (the proportion o f the population in a given market enrolled in HMOs) and the 
number o f HMOs operating in a market. The HMO Enrollment Growth for 1990 -- 2000 is 
as follows:
HMO Enrollment Growth from 1990-2000
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Figure 1: HMO Enrollment Growth from 1990 -  2000
Source: The author’s summary o f  the studies included in this paper
The data used to identify the population of HMOs is the InterStudy HMO Census. It
describes the organizational structure o f HMOs in terms of model type (Independent
Physician Association, Group or Staff): profit status: headquarter location and federal
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qualification. In one study designed to assess the impact of HMO market penetration on 
premiums, the research looked at average premiums, hospital use and ambulatory visits.
Average premiums were constructed by dividing private HMO premium revenues by 
private HMO member months. Hospital use is the number of inpatient days per 
thousand enrollees per year; ambulatory visits are the number of physician and non­
physician encounters per enrollee per year.1
The research shows that as HMO penetration and the number of HMO competitors
increase, group model HMOs reduce premiums, hospital use and increase ambulatory service
use. It suggests that such HMOs achieve at least some of their cost savings by substituting
outpatient and drug therapy for inpatient care, not simply by reducing payments to providers.
Theoretically, price competition occurs in the health insurance market when HMOs compete
amongst themselves and with other insurance plans to gain market share. In theory, price
competition can lead to lower premiums, which in turn can result in lower fees, provider
profits and/or use a different mix of medical care resources such as substituting outpatient for
inpatient care. With increased price competition, the quality of care and its cost could either
increase or decrease in some combination.
Comparisons reported by extent of HMO market share should come closer to 
reflecting the effects of greater competition. People in areas of medium HMO 
penetration were significantly less likely to report improvements in access and quality 
than those in areas of low penetration, but respondents reporting improvement in the 
two areas varied only in a range of 42 to 49 percent. About 60 percent of those in all 
areas considered managed care growth a good thing. The greatest impact on rates 
were found in high, and then in medium penetration areas with 45 to 46 percent of 
these respondents expecting managed care to improve quality.4
The characteristics of plans included breadth of provider choice, perceived access,
interpersonal quality and amenities. Although these surveys were conducted in areas with
growing diversity among plans, the influence of greater price competition, as opposed to
public policy and other factors, cannot be discerned from the results. Proposals to create more
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price-competitive conditions in heath care focus on the individual consumer’s selection of a 
health insurance plan. According to theories, consumers who are sensitive to premiums 
would consider the characteristics of different plans, including but not limited to, the quality 
of the care they offer. Policy changes were implemented in Minnesota hoping to increase 
price competition.
In 1985, the state’s group insurance program required employees to pay the 
additional premiums if they did not enroll in the lowest cost plan; in 1991, a coalition 
of private employers in the Twin Cities instituted the same policy. Although 
employees may pay their share of premiums with before-tax dollars, through 1993 the 
lowest-cost HMO steadily gained market share, and indemnity and high-cost 
managed care plans lost ground.5
These results are consistent with consumers’ choosing lower premiums and managed 
care as an alternative to higher premiums with unrestricted access to autonomous providers. 
From 1988 through 1991, greater HMO market share was associated with lower HMO 
premiums.6
Thus, the past decade has brought increased managed care market share and more 
recently that growth seems to be associated with lower HMO premiums. How have those 
two characteristics affected how HMO’s pay physician organizations, and how do physician 
organizations pay physicians? The literature examines quality and cost-based risk-sharing, 
percent of premium, capitation and in-patient case rate with capitation being the most 
prominent for primary care physicians.
Relationship of Physician Payment Method on Quality
My research examines two local managed care plans’ financial risk arrangements
with a large primary care physician group (PHO). The financial risk is the arrangement that
makes the individual provider, group of providers, hospital and/or insurance plan responsible
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for a certain percentage of the difference between fee for service payments and the budgeted 
capitation. The research will examine only the commercial HMO product for both plans. It 
is important to examine the risk sharing arrangements in each plan to assess those 
arrangements or potential incentives that the primary care physician can control and those 
which are not within their control. For both plans, the average funding level is derived from 
the single- person premium rate multiplied by a loading ratio. That funding level or budgeted 
capitation is adjusted based on age, sex and benefit level for each member annually. In 
analysis o f the contracts, the negotiated funding levels and age/sex adjustment is critical 
because it determines how much money the physician has, based on their risk arrangement, to 
spend on the patients care. Details of the plans are as follows:
PLAN A -  DIRECT HEALTH CARE FUNDS
• COMMERCIAL -  Percent of premium (a risk arrangement that shares the risk of 
the entire premium dollar among the primary care physicians, the hospital and the 
plan.
• PRIMARY FUND -  Fee-for-service (FFS) payments made to primary care 
physicians for services they provide.
• SPECIALIST FUND -  FFS payments made to specialists + certain FFS payments 
made to the hospital that can be performed in the physician office + certain FFS 
payments made to ancillary service providers (excludes payment for psych/ 
substance abuse expenses)
• DRUG FUND -  FFS payments made to pharmacies for prescriptions written by 
the PCP and/or specialist physician (excludes Rx for psych/ substance abuse)
16
INSTITUTIONAL FUND -  FFS payments made to hospital for inpatient & 
outpatient services -  FFS payments charged to specialist fund (excludes psych/ 
substance abuse)
PSYCH/ SA FUND -  FFS payments made to physicians, pharmacies, hospital 
and other psych/ substance abuse providers for services.
GROUP - The large primary care physician group committed to the risk sharing 
arrangement.
PLAN A -  CATASTROPHIC THRESHOLD TIERS (Once the pre determined amount of 
FFS payments has been reached, per member per year, the risk arrangement changes between 
the providers and the plan). Threshold tiers may also be termed Stop/Loss arrangements 
where the physician is capped from additional expenses beyond that threshold tier amount.
PRIMARY FUND -  No catastrophic threshold tiers.
SPECIALIST FUND
* TIER 1 $0 - $4,000
* TIER 2 $4,000 +
DRUG FUND
* TIER 1 $0 - $  1,000
* TIER 2 $ 1,000 +
INSTITUTIONAL FUND
* TIER 1 $ 10,000
* TIER 2 $ 10,000 +
PRREMIUM FUND -  Not applicable
PSYCH/ SA FUND -  No catastrophic threshold tiers
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PLAN REINSURANCE LEVEL - $200,000 any combination of FFS payments 
made from each fund.
Table 1: Plan A Risk Model
FUND POP GROUP HOSPITAL PLAN
Primary 100% 0% 0% 0%
Specialist
Tier 1 33.33% 0% 33.33% 33.33%
Tier 2 0% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
Drug
Tier 1 33.33% 0% 33.33% 33.33%
Tier 2 0% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
Institutional
Tier 1 33.33% 0% 33.33% 33.33%
Tier 2 0% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
Premium 0% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
Psych/ SA 0% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
Plan Reinsurance
0% 0% 0% 100%
Source: This author’s summary o f Plan A ’s Financial Risk Sharing Contract with local 
Physician Hospital Organization (PHO).
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PLAN B -  DIRECT HEALTH CARE FUNDS
• COMMERCIAL -  Capitation and Budgeted Capitation
• PRIMARY FUND -  Full capitation for services provided by the primary care 
physician.
• SPECIALIST FUND - FFS payments made to specialists + certain FFS payments 
made to the hospital that can be performed in the physician office + certain FFS 
payments made to ancillary service providers.
• DRUG FUND -  FFS payments made to pharmacies for prescriptions written by 
the primary care and/ or specialist physician.
Table 2: Plan B Risk Model
FUND PCP GROUP HOSPITAL PLAN
Primary CAP 0% 0% 0%
Specialist
Tier 1 45% 0% 45% 10%
Tier 2 0% 0% 0% 100%
Drug 0% 25% 25% 50%
Institutional
Tier 1 35% 0% 35% 30%
Tier 2 0% 0% 0% 100%
Plan
Reinsurance 0% 0% 0% 100%
Source: This author's summary o f Plan B ’s Financial Risk Sharing Contract with local 
Physician Hospital Organization (PHO).
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It is important to note the risk sharing arrangement in Plan A, is such that the 
physician group begins to function as an insurance vehicle for the individual provider once 
costs have reached the threshold. The risk sharing arrangement with catastrophic thresholds 
eliminates the incentive to withhold care because of cost as it limits the exposure to 
individual primary care physicians by shifting the risk exposure to a group of physicians. In 
both plans, the total premium revenue plays a significant role in the amount of funds allotted 
for the primary care physician.
Both plans are utilizing capitation to align financial incentives among the network 
providers with the goal of reducing health care costs by risk sharing. Capitation payment 
arrangements can range from individual productivity- oriented approaches, based on volume, 
to salary-oriented models based on group performance. Plans A and B are a combination of 
productivity-oriented approaches based on group performance. The use of capitation can 
create powerful economic incentives to move the focus of care away from high-cost settings 
and treatment to community-based services that can better prevent or control the incidence. 
One of the keys to properly managing the risk is reducing the need for medical care without 
denying access to needed care or undermining the quality of care.
In both Plans A and B, not only does the primary care physician have financial 
responsibility for the primary fund, they are responsible for guiding the member through the 
network. Therefore, the primary care physician will utilize several managed care techniques 
to keep utilization and health care costs down. Utilization of the gatekeeper role, 
maintenance of a tight specialist referral panel as well as, medical management programs and 
utilization review are tools that primary care physicians use to maintain and/ or reduce cost. 
Utilization tools are designed to be used for the healthy or temporarily ill member. The 
member that is seriously ill or has a long-term illness tends to be managed by their illness.
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The primary care physician can only really control the first group and should not be worried 
and/or concerned about the costs associated with the second group especially with proper risk 
sharing arrangements in place. Therefore, these utilization controls or tools become the only 
incentives that are within the physicians’ control.
Managed Care Techniques and Quality 
Gatekeeper
Physicians may perceive that utilization controls, such as the gatekeeper, serve as 
incentives or dis-incentives for practice patterns. The “gatekeeper” system was initially set 
up to manage large networks of physicians with little incentive to cooperate and work 
together. As the gatekeeper, the primary care physician must authorize all medical services, 
(e.g. hospitalization, diagnostic work-ups, and specialty referrals) for a member. According 
to research by the American Academy of Family Physicians, as many as 90 percent of 
patients can be safely managed by a primary care physician. A gatekeeper system se nds 
patients along a route they should probably take anyway. In one focus group study among 
primary care physicians in Massachusetts, primary care physicians stated that they naturally 
see their role as a gatekeeper; however, they feel the process puts them in an administrative 
role that has little to do with their clinical responsibilities.
According to Bilodeau (1996), researchers from Duke University Medical Center 
found that if the gatekeeper system isn’t set up properly, primary care physicians may end up 
managing too many tricky specialist cases, with unfortunate results for everyone concerned. 
Researchers found that three-fifths of emergency department patients arriving with chest 
pains remained in the care of a primary care physician. The patients were more likely to die 
within a year of the onset of symptoms than patients managed by a cardiologist.7
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Disease Management
Another approach and/ or alternative to the ‘gatekeeper’ system is the medical or
disease management. This approach gives primary care physicians control of routine cases; 
in turn the care of patients with certain disease states and conditions are turned over to 
specialists. This sends each patient to the professional best able to care for them, while 
keeping referrals under the supervision of the cost-efficient primary care doctor. According 
to Bilodeau (1996), in her article “Trying Out Alternatives to the ‘Gatekeeper’ System,” 
PRIMUS, a Miami based physician-owned HMO established a disease management system, 
rather than traditional gatekeeper, to use treatment protocols and care maps to guide patients 
along. Patients will go through a comprehensive primary care assessment, which will collect 
baseline data and prepare a plan of care, which requires any diagnoses that require ongoing 
treatment. The patient then will be seen by whichever specialists are called for in the 
protocol.7
Disease management seems to be too complex to operationalize because of the 
inherent issues in monitoring and tracking protocols. Additionally, there is a gap in the 
literature as to whether plans and/ or physician groups can be financially successful with 
these programs. However, some form of medical management appears to be necessary in 
maintaining control within the managed care organization and in keeping with quality care. 
United HealthCare o f Minnesota, a large managed care organization, has found success with 
‘gatekeeper’ and disease management systems. They feel their success has been attributed to 
capitation (primary care physicians are paid on a FFS basis and specialists are capitated), 
mutual guidelines development process, and a sophisticated management information system 
to keep close tabs on their physicians.
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Risk Adjustment
Meaningful assessment of patients’ outcomes generally requires a measure of the 
outcome itself and a way to adjust for patients’ risk for various outcomes.8 Given the 
personal stakes, decisions about health care especially require weighing risk of good versus 
bad outcomes, variously defined. There are generally four factors accounting for observed 
differences in patient outcomes: 1) differences in significant risk factors among patients, 2) 
differences in how well available data sources represent reality and these risk factors, 3) 
random variation, 4) differences in the effectiveness of the health services provided or the 
quality of care.
The purpose of risk adjustment is to account for one potential cause of observed 
difference in outcomes- intrinsic patient characteristics that increase risk. The goal of r isk 
adjustment is to account for pertinent patient characteristics before making inferences about 
the effectiveness of quality of care based on patient outcomes. When determining funding 
levels in capitated payment arrangements, risk adjustment is extremely important because 
sicker patients are more likely to require health services that cost more over time. Risk 
adjustment should improve fairness of payment, reduce the likelihood of withholding medical 
care and reduce the risk of exclusion from the plan.
There are several dimensions of risk:
• Age
• Sex
• Race an ethnicity
• Principle diagnosis
• Severity of principle diagnosis
• Extent and severity of co-morbidities
• Cultural and socioeconomic attributes
• Health status and quality of life
• Patient attitudes and preferences for outcomes
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Lisa Iezzoni, M.D. a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and the author 
of Risk Adjustment for Measuring Health Outcomes, says the feasibility of using a risk- 
adjusted system depends on two issues: data collection and the difficulty of predicting health 
care costs.
“You can’t do risk adjustment without data. Under the Medicare program, HCFA has 
the authority to tell managed care plans to submit the data. However, this could 
require costly changes in plans’ information systems, and some plans could leave 
Medicare because of this.” There would be no such directive bolstering any risk- 
adjusted methodology attempted in the private sector. ‘"Non-Medicare participating 
plans,” says Iezzoni, “would have to voluntarily produce the data. You really can’t 
separate the issue of risk adjustment form information-gathering capabilities.”9
Effective January 2000, HCFA planned to use the new risk adjusted methodology in 
the Medicare + Choice program which will use inpatient hospital utilization in one year to 
predict the cost of all services in the following year.9 The new payment system proposes that 
managed care plans will receive extra funds for those Medicare patients that have been 
hospitalized in the previous year for specific conditions. Conditions such as breast cancer, 
lung cancer and Aids will be given bonus funds per beneficiary. Medicare officials estimate 
that this new payment plan could save Medicare $11.2 billion dollars over the next five years. 
However, the question that remains is will HMOs survive with Medicare plans and is the 
payment method sufficient to care for the more seriously ill? As we have seen over the past 
year, many HMOs are no longer providing Medicare Risk programs.
Properly designed risk adjustment models will be a combination of clinical judgment 
and empirical modeling. Clinicians should be involved in identifying and specifying the risk 
variables and reviewing the empirical models for clinical face validity and plausibility. If 
properly developed, the model could discourage cream skimming and encourage physicians 
and health plans to be much more rigorous in their management of specific cases. 
Additionally, it can provide an incentive for physicians to be more conscientious and look 
after patients in the most cost effective manner.
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Physician Perception of Utilization Controls
Part o f the problem when assessing utilization controls and their effect on physician
incentive is a percent of the data represent self-reporting from the physicians’ perspective.
The study from this 1997 Resurvey of Young Physicians (sample size 1549), examines if
contractual arrangements with health plans are associated with physician perception of
financial incentives, i.e., will these incentives increase or decrease the service to patient ratio.
The survey collected information on current practice structure, practice operations, 
arrangements with managed care plans, amount and methods of compensation, 
utilization review, gatekeeper arrangement, communications from insurance plans 
and indicators of satisfaction. The dependent variable, perceived financial incentive, 
is an ordinal measure constructed from two survey questions:
1. How would you describe your overall personal financial incentives in your 
practice? On balance, do the incentives: a) favor reducing services to individual 
patients, b) favor expanding services to individual patients, or c) favor neither?”
2. If the physician answered either a or b, the follow up question was: Have 
these incentives reduced (or expanded, as appropriate) services: a) a little, b) a 
moderate amount or c) a lot?”
The variable constructed from the physician’s responses has four ordered values: 1) a 
strong incentive to reduce services; 2) a moderate incentive to reduce services; 3) no 
incentive to either increase or decrease services; and 4) an incentive to increase 
services.10
In general, the study found several statistically significant relationships that affected
perceived financial incentives. Gatekeeper arrangements with compensation effects, high
risk of exclusion from health plans, patient referrals dependent on costs, being subject to gag
clauses prohibiting disclosure of financial incentives, and participation in one or more
capitated insurance plans all significantly increased the odds that physicians would report
perceived financial incentives to reduce services to patients. Physicians who are not paid by
straight salary are more likely to say their incentives favor increasing services to patients
compared with physicians who receive a straight salary. Physicians who are paid a salary
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with a bonus based on performance are also more likely to report an incentive to increase 
services. Physicians who contract with one or more capitated insurance plans are more likely 
to report an incentive to reduce services to patients when compared with those who treat only 
fee-for-service patients.
Conversely, we found that physicians who are paid a salary with bonus incentives, 
and those who are not salaried tend to report having an incentive to increase services to 
patients. Self-employed physicians or those employed by a non physician-owned corporation 
are more likely to report incentives to reduce services rather than those physicians employed 
by another physician or a physician owned group.
The goal of the study was to determine whether specific aspects of physician’s direct 
arrangements with health plans, their compensation arrangements and their employment 
settings have systematic and significant effects on physicians’ assessments of their overall 
financial incentives in their practices. The study tells us there is a relationship between 
compensation and physician perception but because of the complexity of the study, it is 
difficult to determine the specific impact in each of the compensation variables on that 
relationship. The following factors contribute in making it difficult to measure physicians’ 
financial incentives:
• Contracts may incorporate several types of financial and other incentives to 
influence behavior.
• The influence of any particular arrangement may depend on the proportion of a 
physician’s practice that is devoted to caring for patients covered by that plan.
• The physician’s method of compensation by his practice may be independent of 
the practice’s contractual arrangement with various health plans.
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• Health plans themselves may offer several distinct insurance products under the 
same general name.
The above study tells us physicians’ perceptions are altered by their compensation 
arrangement and their financial arrangement with the payer or plan. Additionally, there are 
good theoretical reasons to believe that financial incentives do have an impact on quality 
however the constant flux in the relations between payers, plans and providers makes it 
difficult to determine the specific variables and their impact on quality. Based on the 
literature reviewed by R.A. Dudley, R.H. Miller, T.Y. Korenbrot and H.S. Luft a gap exists 
in the inability to objectively measure variables indicating risk of exclusion or compensation 
adversely affected by the number of referrals. Also, if overall financial incentives are highly 
correlated with actual contractual incentives, it could also be affected by various attitudinal 
variables.
The impact of incentives to provide more services when those services are small or 
unknown has been shown in several studies of medical appropriateness and shown apparent 
over utilization. Additionally, traditional fee for service can create quality problems for those 
patients who need preventative or “mundane” services that may be ignored resulting in 
“under-utilization” of preventive or routine services.
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Hypothesis
The implementation of quality incentive programs, such as Performance Recognition 
Program and Health Maintenance Grids by two Genesee County health maintenance 
organizations has been a positive financial incentive for primary care physicians. More 
importantly, the implementation of quality incentive programs has improved the overall 
health o f the Greater Flint community.
METHODOLGY
The purpose o f the study is to determine if Quality Incentive Programs are successful 
in providing financial incentives to primary care physicians and maintaining the practice of 
quality care medicine. The results o f the two Genesee County programs were compiled 
utilizing billing data that was confidentially compiled from physician numbers and can’t be 
identified by patient.
In Program 1, the raw data was analyzed and a comparison of means was conducted 
to identify whether there was an increase or decrease from year to year. The reimbursement 
dollar amount to the physician group was provided by Plan A in an introduction to the 
program.
In Program 2, Plan B compiled the raw data from utilization summary reports and 
claims paid data. The summary reports were provided to the group practice (PHO) with 
percentage compliance per each clinical indicator in the formats displayed in Appendices I - 
VI. My research focused on the overall program results and the four qualities of care and 
patient satisfaction measures that were consistent in both years. A comparison of means was 
performed to determine whether there was an increase and/or decrease in financial payments 
and quality care provided.
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This analysis is based on the review of the secondary data compiled by the health 
plans for the purpose of their programs, books and articles. By performing such studies, my 
research will attempt to determine whether Quality Incentive Programs financially 
incentivize the primary care physician and improve the health of the community.
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STUDIES AND FINDINGS OF QUALITY INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
Literature
In January 1997, Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) issued the final rule 
on requirements for physician incentive plans in prepaid health care organizations. The 
regulations govern physician incentive plans operated by federally qualified health 
maintenance organizations and competitive medical plans contracting with the Medicare 
program as well as certain HMOs and health insuring organizations contracting with the 
Medicaid program.
As documented by the Department of Health and Human Services, Rules and 
Regulations, Federal Register: December 31,1996, an organization must meet the following 
requirements if it operates a physician incentive plan:
1) That it not directly or indirectly makes specific payments to a physician or
physicians group as an inducement to limit or reduce medically necessary 
services to a specified individual involved with the organization.
2) That it will disclose to HCFA its physician incentive plan arrangements in 
detail that is sufficient to allow HCFA to determine whether the arrangements 
comply with departmental regulations.
3) If the plan places a physician or group at substantial financial risk for services 
not provided directly, the prepaid health care organization:
a) Provide the physician or group with adequate and appropriate stop- loss 
protections.
b) Conduct surveys of currently and previously enrolled members to assess 
the degree of access to services and the satisfaction with the quality of
c) Requires that organizations with physician incentive plans disclose 
information about those plans to us and to any Medicare beneficiary who 
requests it.
d) Specifies that HCFA may apply intermediate sanctions if it’s determined 
that an HMO or competitive medical plan (CMP) fails to comply with the 
physician incentive plan requirements.11
In 1987, U.S. Healthcare developed a quality-based compensation model through 
which its primary care physicians, hospitals, and specialists can earn additional compensation 
based on quality and cost-effectiveness of the care they provide to their patients. U.S. 
Healthcare is an independent practice association (IPA) model managed care organization 
that contracts with approximately 15,000 primary care physicians, 45,000 specialists and 400 
hospitals. The Quality Care Compensation System (QCCS) was designed to transition the 
traditional incentives of FFS payments to the creation of incentives for quality. As described 
in a journal article:
Their model was implemented with the following contractual relationships between
each of their participating providers. The primary care physicians were capitated by
per member per month (pmpm) and age and/ sex adjusted; the hospital was paid on
fee for service basis which generally includes a per diem rate paid for each hospital1 ?day. Most specialists were capitates in a gatekeeper arrangement.
These compensation arrangements formed the foundation upon which U.S.
Healthcare introduced its quality-based compensation model. Prior to the implementation of 
QCCS, primary care physicians were capitated on a “withhold” model where they would 
receive 80% of the capitated rate bi-monthly. Based on the total costs of care provided 
throughout the year, a portion of the total aggregate withheld amount across all PCPs would
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be returned at the end of the year in the form of a distribution. The withheld amount is an
incentive to discourage over utilization of inappropriate medical care.
After the introduction of QCCS, primary care physicians had the opportunity to
increase their capitated payment and receive additional distributions based on their measured
performance in providing improved quality of care and service and appropriate resource
utilization for members. The four standards of measurement include:
Quality of care was measured through focused medical chart reviews of compliance 
with various health-maintenance performance standards. Quality of service was 
measured through member satisfaction and rates of transfer between physicians. 
Medical directors assessed philosophy of managed care and professional service 
coordinators based on the PCP’s participation in various managed care programs. 
Utilization was determined through hospital inpatient days, specialist costs, and 
emergency department costs.12
The capitation payments and the eligibility for additional distributions are driven by 
the primary care physicians’ overall quality factor, which is derived from three components 
on a semiannual basis: quality review, comprehensive care and utilization.
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Table 3: U.S. Healthcare’s Compensation Model for Primary Care Physicians.
TOTAL PAYMENT= BASE CAPITATION x QUALITY-FACTORED
AND DISTRIBUTION ENHANCEMENT
Depends On:
Quality Review Components Comprehensive Care Components Utilization Components
* M em ber Surveys * Membership size *Hospital Days
* Focused medical care reviews * Scheduled office hours * Specialist Costs
* M em ber transfer rates * Available office procedures * Emergency department costs
* Philosophy o f  MC * Continuing medical education
Source: U.S. Healthcare, Inc., Blue Bell, PA, 1996.
The QCCS has been successful in improving quality within U.S. Healthcare’s 
medical delivery system. Medical chart evaluations have shown demonstrated improvement 
in quality review measures (Figure 2) and audits have shown steady improvement in the 
quality of care.
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PROGRAM 1 -  HEALTH MAINTENANCE GRIDS
The managed care organization (Plan A) established a Clinical Practice Guidelines 
Binder. The binder includes the guidelines and protocols for fifteen different topics and each 
guideline includes a one page summary sheet (grid), which may be removed for easy 
reference. The guidelines and protocols are the product of careful consideration of 
nationwide recommendations, and present the health plans best effort at outlining prevention, 
wellness, and disease management strategies. The goal of the program is to improve patient 
care and the value of the health plan product by developing, implementing, and monitoring 
scientifically sound, evidence-based guidelines and protocols.
The primary care physician is to code and bill each patient visit for the services 
rendered. Additionally, they are to fill out the Health Maintenance Grid (Appendices I-V) for 
each patient visit. Annually, the physician may bill the Health Maintenance Code for $ 100 
reimbursement for each patient who received the appropriate health maintenance measures 
over the course of the year. Chart reviews are conducted by a Quality Improvement Nurse to 
verify proper use of the Health Maintenance Code and appropriate charting.
The primary care physicians’ utilization of the Health Maintenance Code is displayed 
in Figure 3. In the initial year, 1999, the physicians utilized the code 554 times for a 
reimbursement of $55,400. In the next year, 2000, the number of codes rose to 683 for a total 
o f $68,300 and an overall increase of 8%.
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HEALTH MAINTENANCE GRIDS
1999 2000
YEARS
Figure 3: Comparison o f  Health Maintenance Grid Codes
Source: The author's summary o f  the Health Plan Practice Activity Report on procedure 
code 9216A.
PROGRAM 2 -  PERFORMANCE RECOGNITION PROGRAM
The managed care organs zal on (Plan B) developed the Performance Recognition Program as 
a tool to recognize and reward physicians for providing quality care and service to members 
in a cost-efTective manner. The two main categories of incentive in the 1999 and 2000 PRP 
are:
• Quality of Care. as measured by Health Employer Data Information Set (HEDIS) 
and other quality indicators.
• Member Satisfaction, as measured by members' survey responses.
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The indicators were chosen based on a process developed by a cross-functional team 
to determine major health issues that are important to their members and purchasers. For 
Quality of Care measurements, the health plan utilized 1) Breast Cancer Screening, 2) 
Cervical Cancer Screening and 3) Childhood Immunization. For the Member Satisfaction 
measurements, the health plan is using 1) Satisfaction with Ability to Make an Appointment,
2) Satisfaction with Office Waiting Time and 3) Satisfaction with Primary Care Physician. 
The health plan is using the same scale and wording required in Consumer Assessment of 
Health Plan Survey (CAHPS), a member survey tool mandated in its format and 
administration by HCFA. Primary care physicians are credited for services provided to 
members assigned to him/her as of the 31st day of the year regardless of whether the primary 
care physician provided the service. The final report on 1999 Performance Recognition 
Program is available in Appendix VI. Appendix VII contains the 2000 Performance 
Recognition Program result for the large group practice by physician number.
Following is a summary of the scoring method used in the 1999 and 2000 programs.
A) Determine each primary care physician’s total score.
1. PCPs with 75 or more members
o Determine the rate for each PCP indicator
o Compare the rate for each indicator to the goals and award 0, 5, or 10 
points.
o Tally all the points to obtain Total Points Received, 
o Divide Total Points Received by Total Points Possible to arrive at a 
percent, or the PCPs Total Score.
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2. PCPs with less than 75 members
o Determine the member-weighted average of the Total PCP Scores 
for the PCPs with 75 or more members. This result is the Total Score 
assigned to PCPs with less than 75 members.
B) Determine the payment earned by each PCP using the following formulas:
For a PCP Total Score of: The PCP’s Payment Is: 
(mm= member months)
0% to 49% Zero
50% to 79% (Score) x ($2.25) x (mm)
80% to 100% (100%) x ($2.25) x (mm)
Source: This author’s summary o f the Health Plans ’program definition
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Performance Recognition Results
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Figure 4: Performance Recognition Program Results fo r  Years 1999 and 2000 
Source: This author’s summary o f  Plan B's Program Results in 1999 and 2000
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Physician Recognition Performance Results
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Figure 5: Comparison o f Health Plan B's Performance Recognition Program Physician 
Reimbursement Results for 1999 and 200L.
Source: This author’s summary o f Health Plan B's Physician Recognition Program 
Reimbursement Results.
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DISCUSSION
There is a reasonable body of literature that has attempted to evaluate the effect of 
different payment methods on the quality of care, and the overall conclusion in the majority 
o f these studies is that the quality of care in managed care is equal to or better in health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) than in fee-for-service sector.12 Nevertheless, there have 
been on-going concerns about balancing incentives in managed care. Therefore, incentives 
for practicing medicine appear to have intrinsic value. The studi es listed above have 
examined three different types of programs designed to promote financial incentives for the 
primary care physician to practice quality care. Each of these studies suggest that primary 
care physicians have been motivated to improve their performance in the clinical standards 
measured from the inception of the programs to the next year. Additionally, each program 
proved financially beneficial to the primary care physician.
As described in a journal article, U.S. Healthcare states that the actual payment to 
primary care physicians and frequency of their distributions has improved significantly since 
the implementation of their program.
An analysis of Program 1, Health Maintenance Grids shows that the number of grids 
billed increased 8% in the first year of implementation. The total reimbursement to the 
primary care physician group in year 2000 was $68,300, which was up $12,900 from the 
previous year. The most important factor in the implementation of this program is the overall 
improvement in those clinical standards that were measured and were part of the health 
maintenance grid, during the course of this program. For example: the Pediatric Health 
Maintenance Grid (Appendix 1) focuses on age’s birth through five years. Aside from basic 
development assessment (height, weight, and head circumference) and safety violence issues, 
the guideline focuses primarily on childhood immunizations. Those clinical measures that
41
my research was able to analyze included: Breast Cancer Screening, Cervical Cancer 
Screening and Childhood Immunizations. As seen in Figure 6, the PHO’s compliance in 
cervical cancer screening (4.1%) and childhood immunizations (7%) increased from 1999 to 
2000. There was a slight decrease (.4%) in breast cancer screening. Of the three clinical 
measures, the PHO group reported only childhood immunizations as greater than Plan A ’s 
overall market. However, it is important to note that all three clinical measures were 
significantly higher than what the state of Michigan reports and even more importantly, 
greater than current national reports.
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HEDIS COMPARATIVE DATA
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Figure 6: HEDIS Comparative Data for Plan A, 1999 Group Practice, 2000 Group Practice 
and State o f  Michigan.
Source: The author’s summary' o f  the Comparative Plan A Data.
Although the results were similar. Plan B implemented a much more complex 
program in Program 2, Performance Recogniti on Program. The program was similar to that 
of U.S. Healthcare's Quality Care Compensai ion System in thai it was a “withhold” model. 
Plan B withheld $2.25 pmpm (per member per month) to be returned to the primary care 
physician through annual distribution pending the results o f the physician's performance in 
the program. During the program's first year (1999) quality of care measures ncluded: 
Breast Cancer Screening. Cervical Cancer Screening, Reiinal Exams tor Diabetics, and
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Childhood Immunizations. The patient satisfaction measures were Satisfaction with PCP,
Satisfaction with Ability to Make an Appointment and Satisfaction with Office Waiting
Time. In the year 2000, quality of care measures included: Breast Cancer Screening,
Cervical Cancer Screening, Childhood Immunizations, Formulary Compliance, and Generic
Rate. The patient satisfaction measures included: Satisfaction with PCP, Ability to Make an
Appointment and Advice to Quit Smoking. For purposes of consistency between the two
years, this research analyzed the year end results for plan effectiveness and the following four
measures o f quality o f care and patient satisfaction for measurable impact on the greater
community:
Breast Cancer Screening
Cervical Cancer Screening
Satisfaction with Ability to Make an Appointment
Satisfaction with Primary Care Physician
The total scores in the four measures and overall program are identified in the graph below. 
Unfortunately, Childhood Immunizations could not be included in this study due to lack of 
measurable data in both years.
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Figure 7: /  999 and 2000 Performance Recognition Program Results 
Source: The author's summary o f  Plan B ’s Program Results
Figure 7 shows that compliance for Breast Cancer Screening rose from 70% in 1999 
to 79% in 2000. Cervical Cancer Screening demonstrated an increase from 70% in 1999 to 
74% in 2000. However, Satisfaction with PCP decreased from 94% in 1999 to 82% in 2000. 
Satisfaction with Ability to Make an Appointment also decreased from 95% in 1999 to 89% 
in 2000.
A d ifference o f means test was conducted on the overall total score and the two 
quality o f care measures to compare the mean values of both groups (1999 and 2000) to 
determine if  the difference is sufficiently large to conclude that a difference exists between
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the two groups. The difference between the means was measured in terms of standard 
deviation. The following formula uses the t distribution:
(xi - X2)
t= ((0 2,/Ni - l)  + (rf2 /N2-1) |
The difference of means test on the overall total score shows that the improvement 
from 78% in 1999 to 84% in 2000 is statistically significant at the 1% level. The t-statistic 
from the difference of means test is 4.38 and the critical value at the 1% level is 2.576, so the 
improvement is statistically significant at the highest level (1%). The t-statistic from a 
difference of means test on Breast Cancer Screening is 3.03 demonstrating that the 
improvement from 70% in 1999 to 79% in 2000 is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The t-statistic from a difference of means test on Cervical Cancer Screening is 2.06, so the 
improvement from 70% in 1999 to 74% in 2000 is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
These results show a positive relationship between physician incentive programs and the 
increase in quality improvement measures in Genesee County.
Additionally, the payment distribution to the primary care physician group in 1999 
was $ 119,157. In 2000, that performance improvement represented a payment distribution 
o f $267,713, an approximate 45% increase in capitation reimbursement. It is also significant 
to note that Plan B’s capitated reimbursement level rose from $ 1.05 pmpm in 1999 to $ 1.60 
pmpm as a direct result of the success of the Performance Recognition Program and the 
physician group distribution payment.
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CONCLUSIONS
There is little doubt that managed care organizations can have an impact on the 
quality o f care and service delivered in the community. As we have seen from the literature 
and the three studies examined, it is possible for managed care organizations to balance their 
need to contain costs and produce quality care medicine. A strategic physician incentive 
program should include:
• appropriate financial motivation of physician productivity
• managed care efficiency
• A group citizenship component
• A patient satisfaction component and
• A group profitability component.
The intent of a physician incentive program is to remove the temptation for physicians to 
“over doctor” while ensuring that they are nevertheless motivated to provide quality care 
within a framework of finite resources.
The three studies examined demonstrate increased compensation for the primary care 
physician. The compensation arrangement may vary by Plan as to whether it is a percent of 
the premium or capitation or in the case of Plan B have a positive influence on the amount of 
reimbursement. Regardless of the compensation arrangement, there is only one he althcare 
dollar for distribution and in each program the primary care physician has increased their 
piece of the healthcare dollar.
Of even greater significance is the overall impact the improvement generated from 
the quality of care measures implemented in these programs. The cost/ benefit analysis 
associated with the impact of these increases in quality care are essential for health care
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administrators in developing future risk arrangement models between physician groups and 
plans. Additionally, these measure improvements have a profound impact on the health of 
our community now and in the future as we look to Healthy People 2010 to project our 
national targeted goals. Healthy People 2010 is a set of national health promotion and 
disease prevention objectives developed in the United States with two overarching goals for 
the nation: (1) increase years of healthy life and (2) eliminate health disparities. It is partially 
based on health statistics and projections developed by the Bureau of the Census and the 
National Center for Health Statistics.14
According to NCQA’s The State of Managed Care Quality, Quality Compass, 2000, 
the national average Breast Cancer Screening rate increased from 73.4% in 1999 to 74.5% in 
2000. This 1.1% increase means that an additional 35,000 of the 3.5 million women who 
were eligible for the measure were screened in 2000. This increase in performance translates 
to approximately 130 lives saved. The United States’ goal for the year 2010 is that 70% of 
women aged 40 years and older will have received a mammogram within the preceding 2 
years.
The national average for Cervical Cancer Screening rate dramatically increased from 
72% in 1999 to 78% in 2000. This increase of more than 6% is so significant because 
cervical cancer is nearly 100% preventable if detected early. Estimates of the incremental 
cost-effectiveness of conventional Pap screening every three years compared with no Pap 
screening is $4,097 per life-year saved.15 Healthy People 2010 target 90% women aged 18 
years and older who received a Pap test within the preceding 3 years.
NCQA reports national improvements in Childhood Immunization rates for every 
vaccine measured between 1999 and 2000. The overall rates in participating managed care 
plans averaged between 70% and 88% for each of the six HEDIS status vaccinations. In the
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United States, vaccine-preventable diseases are rare but, do occur and can be costly to treat as 
well as have severe quality of life consequences. Healthy People 2010 target 95% children 
under age 6 years who participate in fully operational population-based immunization 
registries.
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Figure 8: Quality o f  Care Measures for the Group arui Plans A & B in Comparison to NCQA 
and Healthy People 2010
Source: This author’s summary o f the studies included in this paper.
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The models and Quality Incentive Programs examined in this paper show positive 
results for the quality of care delivered in this community and progressive movement tow ard 
the goals of our country in improving the overall health. Quality Incentive Programs do w ork 
in both incentivizing the primary care physician and improving the quality of care delivered.
It is not determined from the research exactly what the motivation behind the improvement 
process is but, only that the there are financial incentives and improvement in quality care 
measures.
My research also shows that plans need to continually improve their collection of 
data and effectiveness of their measurement processes in order to continue to incentivize 
physicians to fully participate in Quality Incentive Programs. Consistent analysis and 
monitoring of Quality of Care measures can be further improved through the utilization of an 
electronic medical record. Additionally, further research is needed on risk adjustment based 
on severity of illness and could be implemented as a strong component in future risk 
arrangement models that would also enhance the overall quality of care in the community.
Finally, my research shows that primary care physicians can benefit financially by 
practicing quality medicine while maintaining costs. I believe that my research will help to 
eliminate some of the myths about balancing quality care medicine and financial incentives 
for physicians. However, society needs to continually improve the perception of managed 
care organizations and their delivery of quality care in our communities.
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GENESYS PHO-1997
PEDIATRIC HEALTH MAINTENANCE GRID
AGES BIRTH-5 YEARS
APPENDIX I
PATIENT NAME:.
PATIENT DOB:
Highlighted areas -  Services not required at that time.
2 mths 4 mths 6 Mths 18 mths9 mths 15 mths 24 mths12mths
Safety/ Violence 
Cm fwh) sec.
PEA Develop. 
to tsu M S t/ Hl, 
WLjiemddre. 
tUrtk~2ycmn) HL, 
WL, bbrtk-5jn.)
Once m this age group
HIB*fsce
footnote)
Once in age group
Once in this age group-OPVPO UO  
(ImjedmbU/Oral)
Once in this age 
group
Once in this age groupHEPATITIS B
Once in this age groupVARICELLA 
TB TEST
Once in this age group
Cholesterol 
(lfJmm*,Hx,)
Once m this age group
Sickle CeU
Thyroid, PKU
Once in this age group Once in this age groupUrinalysis
Heariag Screen
V ision Screes
•Children who receive Pedvax HIB at 2 and 4 months do oot require a dose at 6 months. 18 month dose is still needed.
•Injectable polio is recommended, by the CDC, to be given at 2 and 4 months, and oral is recommended at 6-18 months and 4 years of age.
RttflttfCg:
AAFP—American Academy of Family Physicians CHPS— Clinician's Handbook of Preventive Services
AMA American Medical Association AOA— American Optomctnc Association
USPSTF-U.S. Preventive Services Task Force AAP— American Academy of Pediatrics
(See reverse side for expliaatioa of Safety/Violeace)
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ADOLESCENT HEALTH MAINTENANCE GRID 
AGES: 6 To 17 Years
PATIENT NAME
PATIENT DOB
Highlighted areas= Services not required at that time
6 Yrs. 7 Y n . 8 Yrs. 9 Yrs. 10 Yrs. 11 Yrs. 12 Yrs. 13 Yrs. 14 Yrs. 15 Yrs. 16 Yrs. 17 Yrs
Safety/Violence 
Seatbelts* Helmets* 
Firearms
B ehavioral
Assessment
Depression
R isk Evaluation  
Alcohol/Tobacco 
Drugs/Sexual Risk
PE Ht,W t, 
every 2yn.) 
(Including testicular
D e v e lo p m e n ta l— 
C lin k s  I b reast exam 
E ducation  on exams
M M R
Td
V a r ic e lla  (If lack 
o f reliable Hx.)
Hepatitis B
( I f  not previously
invminized)
(Sexually active or 18 & older—evety 1-3 yTS.) 
(Physicians discretion)
If not done 'a, 4-6 
Yrs.
(At 11-16 Yrs. If 5 yis. have elapsed since last dose)
Once in this age 
group if lack, of Hx.
Series in this age 
group
CBC/HH Once in this age group Once in this age group
Cholesterol If family Hx., race in this age group
Hearing Screen
Vision Screen
D o n e  w i th  e v e r y  2 y e a r  P E  a n d /o r  w i th  s p o r t s  p h y s i c a lUrinalysis
(Sexually active or 18 yrs. & older—evety 1-3 yrs.)Pap/Pemc
Resources:
AAFP American Aacademy of Family Physicians CHPS—Clinician’s Handbook of Preventive Serv ices
AMA  American Medical Association AOA-—American Optometric Association
USPSTF— U.S. Preventive Services Task Force AAP American Academy of Pediatrics
(Sec reverse side for explanation of Safety/Violence/Behavioral Assessment/Risk Evaluation)
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GENESYS PHU-1997 ht't'H'iULA i l l
YOUNG ADULT HEALTH MAINTENANCE GRID
AGES 18-39 Years
PA TIEN T NAME:
PATIENT DOB:__
AGES 18-19 20-21 22-23 24-25 26-27 28-29 30-31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
EXAM
disk Evaluation 
Tobacco, Alcohol 
Drugs, Sexual Risk
Safety / Violence 
Auto Safety 
Helmets
Behavior
Assessment
Depression
PE (Every 3 yrs)
Blood Pressure 
( Every 2 yrs.)
*
Skin Evaluation 
(Yearly)
Cholesterol 
(Every 5 yrs)
Breast Exam
(Every 1-3 yrs.)
Cakium/HRT Tx. HiMlH Hi iipipil
Pap/Pelvic (Every 
3 yrs.) ( I f  sexually 
active or on BCP, 
yearly)
i
i i
i
Testicular Exam 
(Yearly)
i
Td (Every 10 yrs.)
Resources:
AAFP= American Academy of Family Physicians AAD= American Academy o f Dermatology
SCF = Skin Cancer Foundation ACOG= American College o f Obstetricians & Gynecologists
USPSTF=U.S. Preventive Services Task Force ACP= American College o f Physicians
AUA= American Urological Association ACS = American Cancer Society
(See reverse side for explanation o f Safety/Violence/Behavioral Assessment/Risk Evaluation and HPM recom m endations)
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PATIENT NAME
PATIENT DOB
U L U L Q ia  r n u - 1 7 7 /
ADULT HEALTH MAINTENANCE GRID 
AGES 40-64
IghBghUd areas- Services not required at that time
AGES
EXAM
40-41 42*43 44-45 46-47 43-49 50-51 52-53 54-55 56-57 53-59 60-61 62-63 64
R hk C v ik a tiM  
f 4 floet, Ak*koi
Safet]f/V M eacc 
Am* v^ ety
Behavioral Assessment 
P qw iib ii) Sedentary
PE (Every 1-2yn.)
Rood Pressure (l-2yri)
Breast Exam (Yearly}
Clolcsteral
(Every SynJ
Digital Rectal (Yearly)
Glaucoma
(Every 2-4 Yean)
Hemoccuh (Yearly)
Mammogram
(l-2yrL4*49)(YeaHy>$0) 
C ikha/H R T  T i
Pap/Pebrk (Yearly)
Prostate Exam (Yearly)
PSA (Yearly)
Sigmoidoscopy 
(Every 3-3 yr%)
Ski* Evaluation (Yearly)
Testkalar Exam 
(Yearly)
Td (Every ID yn.)
AAFP American Academy of Family Physicians
AMA-----American Medical .Association
USPSTF—U S. Preventive Services Task Force
ACS------ American Cancer Society A.AO---- American Academy of Ophthalmology
(See reverse side for eipUioatioB of Risk Evalualion/Safety/Vioknee/Behivorial Assessment, sod HPM recommendations)
RESOURCES:
CHPS—  Clinician s Handbook of Preventive Services 
A COG— American College of Obstetricians A Gynecologists 
•American Urological .AssociationAt’A-
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GENESYS PHO-1W7
ADULT HEALTH MAINTENANCE GRID
AGES 65+
APPENDIX V
PATIENT NAME
PATIENT DOB
AGE 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
Risk Evataition
Tobocca Alcohol, Dental 
Satriikm, Physical activity
Safety/Violence 
Falls, Amo safety
Beknvioril Assessment 
Sedentary
YZ (Yearly)
Blood Press a re (Yearly)
C b v co a i (Yearly)
Vision exam »
Hearing exam
Skia Evaleation (Yearly)
Mammogram (Yearly)
Caknm/HRT Ts.
Pip/Petvic (Yearly)
Ckolesterol (Every 3 yrs.)
Heaoccnk (Yearly)
Prostate Exam (Yearly)
Digital Rectal (Yearly)
Sigmoidoscopy (3-5 yn)
Testicabr Exam (Yearly)
Td (Every 10 Yrs.)
laflaeaza Vaccine (Yearly!
Pneomococcus Vaccine Recoo> needed at least oace over 65 yean of age.
AAFP---- American Academy of Family Physicians CHPS—  Clinicians Handbook of Preventive Services
AMA-----American Medical Association ACOG— American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists
USPSTF—US. Preventive Services Task Force Al'A------American Urological Association
ACS— — American Cancer Society AAO------American Academy of Ophthalmology
(See reverse side for eiplaiaatioa of Risk Cviluatioo/Safety/Viokflce/Bchavorial Assessmeat)
5 6
T) T) "0 TJ T) T) T) T) "0 T) T) T ) TJ T) T l "0 T l T l T l T) T l T)00 cd p Ol 00 Oi 00 -'■J CD CD CD Ol CD 00 -vj 00 00 CD CD 00 00
cd -p. 00 co to o CD -'■J -P O N) Ol o -P oo on -P NO P 00 -'■J-'■J O) p cd Ol — k. -'■J cd —k oo CD oo CD __i ro 00 00 CD CD O NOro 00 o CD 00 -'■J —k ->l -P __1 on CD CD Ol p oo Ol CD 00 O O
to p CD
00
to Ol -P 00 00 on CD on o CD N) 00 00 CD 00
O O o O o o c i c i O O O O q O O O O O O O O d
"0  T ) T ) T ) T)
“n =  - n - n - n - n - n ^ - n - n - n - n - n ^ T i - n - n  T ) ^ T ) -D -0 -0 -D ^ T ) T ) ~ 0 T ) T ) ^ T I T ) -D
OO^W( DOTM( DM- s l Oi OO( DM- 1 - 1‘ O O ^ 0 ^ O ^ ^
a ) O l S O ) ^ O O ^ M O O N S W S ( D C O I O W O O ^ O O
Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
O O "-I M CD
o  o  cn  o Z  Z
O  00  sO O) N -'I CJ1 00 Ol P  o  p  o
o O o Ol Ol Ol CD 00 Ol CD oo Ol
o O o O O o ro 00 00 z ~nI 00 oo
o' o' o' 'So' O ' s^!o' 'So' vPo' vPo' > 'So' O ' 'Oo'
->l 00 00 ->l CD CD CD 00 CD 'si CD CD
— i oo NO 00 ->l Ol CO Ol Ol z CD —
o' s£o' o' o' 'So' o' sPo' sPo' 'Oo' > vPo' s °o' 'Oo'
CD 00 -'I CD 00 00 CO CO CO CDO CD z 00 NO 00 to z oo NO N) COvPo' N?o' > vPo' •sSo' vPo' 'Oo' > o' sPO' >Po' 'OO'
O CD 00 CD CD CD CO o CD OO Ol z CD Ol P CD z oo O Os°o' v°o' > o' 'So' soo' 'S’o' > sOo' o' o' 'So'
>
O O CD CD CO CD CO O O 00O O z P -vl P oo z 00 o O onvPo' s©o' > s°o' sOo' v°o' 'Oo' > vPo' vPo' sOo' o'
> >
on on CO CO 00 CD on ~nINO CD on -'I 00 p ~nI'Oo' vPo' o' 'So' 'Oo' •sSo' 'OO' 'Oo'
00 00 O CO O ~nI CO OCO CD O ~nI O CO to o'Oo' 'Oo' 'So' 'Oo' o' 'Oo' o' •s?o'
-sj O CO CO O 00 CO CD00 O -'I ~nI o 00 fO 00'Oo' 'Oo' o' 'So' 'So' 'Oo' 'Oo' 'Oo'
-sj on ~nI ~nI on CD O 00 CO 00 2 cn on CD CD ~nI ~nI ~nI Ol on '•jP CO OO CO CD 00 o ~nI 00 p —^ CO O P 00 00 NO CO CO NO
o' ■po' o' o' ■po' Po' 'So' o' sPo' sPo' vPO ' O ' sPO ' ' Oo' ' Oo' ' Oo' 'So' ' Oo' >Po' 5? 5?
PC P ID
Last Nam e
First Initial
D egree
S p ec ia lty
A verage P an e l S ize
A ccepting  New M em b ers
D hildhoom  Im m u n iza tio n s
B reast C a n c e r  S c re e in g
C ervical C a n c e r  S c re e in g
Form ulary  C o m p lian ce
Office W aiting  T im e
Ability to  m ak e  an  a p p o in tm e n t
S a tis fac tio n  w ith  PC P
Advice to  Q u it S m o lin g
>CP Final S co re
57
1999 
Perform
ance 
R
ecognition 
Program 
a
ppe
n
d
ix 
v
i 
PCG 
Sum
m
ary 
R
eport
^  ^  T) T) T)^  O) O) O) (Dro £  o  P  to
«  O) —i O) u
-£*■ 'si GO 'si pOon
Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl TJ TlOl CD CD —s Oi "si CD CD -si CD CD Ol 00 CD Ol CD 00 00 CDO CD O o ro GO O IO -si P —i. CD O CD Ol -si GO ■P.— 00 to —^ CD CD GO O GO Ol P GO O GO CD GO -si CD CDCO P CO -o GO -vl IO CD Ol — Ol GO 00 —k — ■P. Ol GO OO00 Ol CD
■p.
CD CD 00 CD CD GO O GO 00 CD CD 00 Ol
m
H D ^ D T ! ( f l C f l C 0 ' - C ) t - Q ^ ( D | o > O < O O m >
co
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O O O 0 O O 0 0 O 0 0 O 0 0 0
3 ! Z ! F " O I I ] I I ] F " r i "r i "r | - r | “r | “n ~ n -n -n -n -n -n " n -n " n _o -n
D T ] ^ m l ] l ] s* ‘0 1 ] ' 0 ' 0 ' 0 ‘0 ' 0 1 ] T l T | - D T 3 - 0 - 0 - 0 mT 3
to
__ X
NOO CD CD Ol o to CD Ol CD "si too
__i.
-P OCD NO 00 to ro 00 — v to — *■ Ol -P 00 CD CD CD
Z Z Z : ± Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z - ± Z
> > > g > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > § >
-PO OO CDCD Z
-o
GO
00
CD
CD
-o
Ol•vl
-o
GO
CD-o Z
-vl
Ol
■o
Ol
OlO -'1CD 00Ol OO CD-o -oOl ''ICD Ol-'1 oo z
GO
CO
v°oN "8o ' v°o ' > V?o ' S°o ' 'So ' s?o ' o ' vPo ' > 'Oo ' "8o ' 5? 'Oo ' 'Oo ' 'So ' 'So ' o ' 'So ' 'So ' vPo ' > 'Oo '
Ol
"s|
CO
O
CD
Ol 2
-'1
ho
CD
CD
CD
Ol
-P
NO
00
CD
-'1
GO
O
O
-'1
GO
CD
O
CD '•J
O
CDto 00CD ^1 OlOl ooto CD-'1 00o z
's iro
'Oo ' -Oo ' sOo ' > 'po ' vPo ' o ' 'So ' 'Po ' 'Po ' 'So '
sOo ' 'Oo ' 'Po ' 'So ' 'Oo ' 'Po ' 'SO' 'Oo ' 'SO' 'Oo ' o ' > -s°O '
O Ol 'si O -P CD CD 00 CDO CO CD O CO ~sj Ol CD —is
sPo' "8o ' s°o ' s?o ' "8o ' S?O' 'So ' "8o ' 'So '
O CD CD O CD CD o CD oo -P ro o "si "si o Ol o
'SO' "8o ' sOo ' 'So ' Oo ' Oo ' s?o ' Oo '
> >
O O -'1 CD O CD CD 00 CD 00 o oo o -'1 -'1 o -P to Ol Ol to o Z oOo ' sOo ' sPo ' Oo ' 'So ' s °o ' '5o ' o ' o ' -s°o ' 'Po ' > 'So '
O  CD OO CD CD 
O  M -si GO 00
OO CD 00 CD CO Ol Ol CO oo
00p oo CD"si CD CDP CD CDCD z z
CD"si Oo 00-'1 CDCO OO CDP 00 CDto CDCO 00to Oo z'So ' sOo ' 'So ' "8o ' "8o ' s?o ' 'Oo ' > > spo ' 'So ' 'So ' 'So ' sOo ' Po ' s?o ' soo ' '8o ' o ' sOo ' >
CD o CD ~vl 00 00 "si p O 00 "si CD CD ■o 00 CD "si 00 CD 00 o CD
CD o P CD "si "si CD "si o CD "si O CD 'si CD CO 00 CD CO o o -si
5? sPo ' '8o ' ' $o ' vPo ' po '
soo ' '8O' s°o ' -Po ' •sPo ' •sPo ' 'So ' 'So ' 'So ' ■sPo ' 'Oo ' 'Oo ' 'So ' 'Po ' 'Po ' ' 8o '
PCP ID
L ast N am e
F irst Initial
D egree
S p ec ia lty
A verage P an e l S ize
A ccepting  N ew  M em b ers
C hildhoom  Im m u n iza tio n s
B re a s t C a n ce r S c re e in g
C ervical C a n ce r S c re e in g
Form ulary  C o m p lia n ce
Office W aiting  T im e
Ability to  m ak e  an  a p p o in tm e n t
S a tis fac tio n  w ith  PC P
Advice to  Q uit S m o lin g
>CP Final S c o re
5 8
5  -000 -aJ -bk CQ
CD O  
AJ 00 
a J O
Tl T Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl T Tl ■U ■u Tl "0 TJ ■u ■UCD Aj CD 00 CD Ol on 00 CD CD CD Ol CD CD CD Aj CD CD —A CD CD on CDOl CD on 00 o CD CD oo NO Ol CD CD 00 CD O -Pa -Pa — A o o -Pa CD Oi00 o oo CD -Pa Aj CD CD CD OO aj CD O aJ Ol O CD o 00 -Pa aj 0000 00 00 Aj
2
o oo o CD OO 00 CD -Pa 00 OO — A Aj Aj "vl NO on oo OO•o CD 00 CD 00 NO -aI -Pa 00 O CD 00 00 CD oo -PA Ol -Pa Ol
m
< | O S O S O r i 0 ^ n 3 ^ W m H ^ Z 7 ] ' D T J O ' D ' D r
o O a o o o a o O o O a o o O o O o o o D o o o o
- o o - n - n - n - n - n  =  - D D c j ) - n - n - n - n - n - n - n ^ - n  m-o'O'D'D'D'O^ mm-o'D'D'D'D'DTI'D^ 'D Tl Tl
 ^ ^  ro  —^ ro  _». _v _ i —'■ no co —^S ^ W W - ^ M M N W O D N O D S W O O O O N O D t D r O - ^ O O r O - i O- ^ - ^ 0 ^ w w - ^ s ( D O ) ^ - ^ o w s N M s y i w - ^ o ) o o - ' j ^
IO
> > g > > > > > > > g g > > > > > > > > > > > g >
-pA Ol 00 NO aJ CD Aj 00 O
00 O z oo Ol on NO Ol o O
A?dA -s°dA > d^
. od^ Apd^ a?dA aPC)A A?C>A aOdA
00 aJ CD on OO 00 CD 00on —a Z O NO 00 4^ CJ1 00 CDAp . o o'- > -Pd^ d^ A? a°(JA A°O ' A?o ' a°o '
> >
CD 0000 z 0000 CD~aJ CDO OlO z 00O 00o z 00CO 0000ApdA A?dA > A?dA . o 8a A?dA aPdA > aOdA aPdA > ApdA ApdA
on 00 Ol ■Al CD Aj CD 00 00 CD CD •Aj CO
CD -Aj CD CD 00 00 CD CD CO -b*. 00 NOaOdA aOdA a°dA ApdA aPdA A?dA A?dA A°dA aOdA aOdA A?dA ApdA a5dA
O  o  O l to  N  N  <D Oo ' T ' - z o r o o o - ' - ^ oaP aT^ T aP aP aP aP aP aP aP
OO
00 ■aI Aj O CO CO CD CO CO 00
00 00 Ol O NO Al z z CD CD z CD CD
dA ApdA ApdA ApdA A°dA ApdA > > A?dA aPdA > A?dA A?dA
CO O CO CO 00 O O CO CO CO o COOl O CJ1 OO NO O O CD CD -b» O NO
A?dA aPdA A?dA dA dA dA ApdA A?dA ApdA APdA ApdA A?dA
00
Z  °° Z  Z
>  d? >  >
O O CO CO -Al O O 00 CO 00 O O
O O 00 CD 03 O O 00 CD O O O
'•PdA ASdA dA A?dA A?dA aOdA a5dA a5dA A?dA A°dA ApdA ApdA
CD
ro
O  CD CD CD
Z  Z  o  oo z  cd cd
^  V° Np V  V° vP^  ^  d^ qa ^  o'- d"-
> >
COO o CONOo z o CDsPdA a°dA > A?dA V?dA
CD•o -b*. NO ■Al AJ ■Al Aj 00 CO O CD 00 CD Aj CD 00 CD 00 Aj 00 CO 00 CO-Al NO —v —^ —^ --^ NO CO O Aj NO —*■ Aj CO O O CD CD -b. NO NO O
A?dA a?dA spdA A?dA ApdA dA dA dA aPdA aPdA aUdA aPdA aPdA aPdA ApdA A?dA a§dA ApdA A§dA aOdA A?dA A?dA
PCP ID
L ast N am e
First Initial
D egree
S p ec ia lty
A verage P an e l S ize
A ccep ting  New M em b ers
C hildhoom  Im m u n iza tio n s
B reas t C a n c e r  S c re e in g
C ervical C a n ce r  S c re e in g
F orm ulary  C o m p lian ce
Office W aiting  T im e
Ability to  m ak e  a n  a p p o in tm e n t
S a tis fac tio n  w ith  PC P
A dvice to  Q u it S m o lin g
*CP Final S c o re
59
T l TJ to 004k 4k 
- 'J
TJ T  TJ Tl TJ Tl
N  ®  O l (J) 00  O )
^  O  CD ^
O  05 -SJ 05
CO O  O oo
ro  K3 CO O! ro  oooo co co
T l4k
2o
TJ T l TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ T l T l TJcn CXI —k cn 00 -'•j 05 05 05 cn CO 00 •o 00 00 CD 05 00 00
CD ro o CO -Nj 4k O ro cn o —k 4k co cn -p. ro 4k CO -o
05 cn —k -'i 05 —k. CO 05 CO CD —k. ro _v CO 00 CD 05 o ro
CO CO -'•J —J -pk. —k. —X cn 05 CO cn -p. CO cn 05 00 o o4k CD
00
ro cn -tk. CO CO cn 05 cn o CD ro CO CO CD 00
m
G ) S n 3 O | > < o ^ O m W 7 J W < - ^ T J 7 ; S ' - 7 J D D 0 S t - r S
^ o o ^ ^ a ^ o o ^ ^ o o s o s ^ ^ o o o o o ^ s o o ^
o O O O O O o O O O D O O O O D O O O O O O O O D O O o
T I T i m m T i n T I T I T I T l T J T I T l T l T I T I T I ^ T J T i r j T I T I T l ^ O T I ^  
T T I T J T J T J T J T J T J T J T J m T J T J T J T J T J T J ^ m T J i j T I T J T I ^ T j T J ^
n
ro  —k inj —*■ r\j r o - ^ - k i o - ^ - ^ - ^ - ^ - > - - ^ - ^ r o - ^ - ^ - ^ r o
O O l O M U l C D O O l t O O O C O C O O O t O - f i i i O C D C O - i C D - f i M ^ O O O O  CO- ' JwoO- ^r OO) Ul - l C»MI OWI OM( OWWO) ( DUl COr OOO- ^CO- i -i
O O i - O i - O i - O O r - O O r - Q i - r - O O O r - O O r - O O O i - O
ro o o r
z z z z z Z z Z z z
00
o z z z 0505 z o z 0505 z
o ' o '
O
vP
O ' o '
"J 05 00 05 05 cn 05 CD
-kJ 05 CO CD 4k o cn CD 05 4*
"So ' N°o ' o ' s °o ' o ' o ' s ?o ' o ' s °o ' o '
•o
05
M  00 M  S  00  O l CJ1
ro -o  io  o i -ti. -o  ro
•oco
z z z
z z z z
■Vl
ro
4k -o
cn 05
05
C O M O J C D O M C O C O U i
a i t o o w c o r o o M o
■>4 - 'I "si 's j 00 's j 00 's j 00 05 -kJ -s | 00 ■vl 05 00 •o •o 05 ■vl •0 •0
ro o —1 05 00 4k 05 CO cn o cn -Pk ro o 05 o 00 05 ro CO —k. --k CO CD ~sl 05 CO
o^- o ' o ' s °O ' 'OO ' 'SO ' ■-sO' 'SO ' S °O ' ■-SO ' sPO' 'SO ' O ' 'SO ' 'OO ' s °O ' s ?O ' 'S’O ' -s?O ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'SO ' O ' O ' 'SO '
cn cn cn cn cn -si cn 05 -tk cn cn 4k cn cn 4k cn cn cn -kJ cn cn cn -Pk. -Pk O l cn 05
05 _k o o ro O l 05 00 CD ro cn _ k 05 05 o cn cn 00 ro 05 •o -Pk -Pk 0 O'So ' v °o ' o ' 'OO ' 'SO ' 'SO' 'OO ' 'SO ' O ' 'SO ' O ' v °O ' 'SO ' O ' 'OO ' sPO' sPO ' 'S ’O ' 'SO ' 'SO ' s °O ' O ' O ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'SO '
CD ->J "si 00 00 CD CD 00 -7 00 " 7 05 CD (--N 00 CD CD CD CD -Pk —7 ~vl 05 CD
-N| 00 05 o 00 cn o o 4k o o CO CD O /--N -kJ 00 00 —k. IO —k. ro —k. 05'So ' s °o ' N°o ' oO ' 'OO ' O ' 'SO '
o
'SO ' 'SO '
o
'SO ' O ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'SO '
u'SO ' 'SO ' spO ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'OO '
'p
O ' O ' 'SO ' kPO '
oo -P* 's i _k -vj 00 CD cn _k 05 00 ^7 CD 05 00 CD CD 05 00 cn 05 ro •O
CD 05 o 05 cn 05 o o o O i l 05 05 cn -s | 05 O l cn ■vl 00 00 05 IO -Pk CD'So ' 'Oo ' 'Po ' o'SO ' 'OO ' 'SO ' O ' s ?O '
o'SO '
o
O '
sPO ' O ' 'OO ' sPO ' 'SO ' 'SO ' s$O ' 'SO ' sOO ' 'OO ' O ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'SO ' 'SO '
0(5 05 CO •0 05 cn -si cn05 ■O CO 00 cn 0 0 0 0
'SO' 'SO ' 'SO '
w
'SO ' O '
_^j
'SO '
'OO ' O ' 'SO ' kPO '
G ) _  n J ^  w  00
o  ^  ai  2  w  wvO ^  sP A V° vP0s ^  5^ 0s 0sO
05 CO 05
ro co 05 o  o  o  o
05 -7 00 
"O “  CO
00 ■U k>J -*i cn -s | -vl cn cn -0 o> 05 00 cn 00 cn -0 " J -vl cn cn - j CO cn cn cn 05
CO CD 05 CD O l -0 05 CO O CO 4^ 00 0 _k 0 cn CO ■si 0 CO 00 0 0 0 CO
'SO ' 5 ? k»O ' 'O 3 ? S ? s ? S ? S ? 3 ? sPO ' 3 ? 'O s s k®O ' 3 ?
k ? 3 ? kPO ' 3 ? 3 ? kPo ' kPo ' 3 ? 3 ? 'So ' 3 ? 3 ?
m Cfr c e Cfi Cfi m CB <& m m CB CB CB <B CB CB CB CB CB CB CB <B CB CB
cn r o ro r o -pk r o co
' co r o . 05 . CO -P* _ro CO to CO
05 co V j N) “cd ”_k. CO CO CO co cn “-0 05 V j CD CD "CD O "'kl cn O CD "-Pk CO "-kj
0 05 ro CD cn 05 CD cn 05 CO 0 05 -Pk CO CO CO 05 — k -si cn —k -Pk --J cn ro
ro cn ->l CO r o CO -O CO cn 05 -0 —k -0 -Pk CO CO —k co CO CD O CD -Pk
<D
1
<35 cn O ipk !_k. !_v co CO 0 cn !_k. ro CO i o CD CO CD 00 00 L-k O 4k ’_k
CO ro cn 05 0 ro ro CD co —*■ -O -0 0 —*■ O -*■ 00 -P- CD CD “ 11 CO CO
PCP ID
Last N am e
First Initial
D egree
Specialty
A verage P an e l S ize
A ccepting N ew  M em bers
■Childhoom Im m u n iza tio n s
B r e a s t  C a n c e r  S c re e in g
IC ervical C a n ce r S c re e in g
F o rm u la ry  C o m p lian ce
G e n e r ic  R ate
lAbility to  m ak e  an  a p p o in tm e n t
(Satisfac tion  w ith  PC P
lAdvice to  Q u it S m o lin g
P C P  Final S c o re
PC P  P a y m en t E arn ed
6 0
2000 
Perform
ance 
Recognition 
Program 
a
ppen
d
ix 
v
ii
 
 
PCG 
Sum
m
ary 
R
eport
Tl TJ Tl 
O ) (D  O )cn w cnCO CD CO
^  -si cn 
Cl CO —*■
Tl “0 “0 TJ TJ Tl TJ TJ TJ Tl TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ TJ Tl Tl TJ TJ TJ T) TJ TJ TJ TJOl 00 — CD Ol Ol Ol CD cn Ol Ol cn -sj Ol cn -sj Ol CD cn 00 Ol cn Ol 00 00 Olo IO o IO -Ps o -P» M o cn o O M Ol O __i M -sj 4*. Ol o CD cn -sj Ol -P»cn CD —x Ol Ol —i. Ol Ol __i Ol M —V CD CD Ol o Ol cn 4*. Ol o Ol cn Ol -si CD Olro Ol -sj 4*. -sj Ol -sj 4^ Ol 4^ CD -sj Ol -sj M CD cn __i cn Ol 00 —^ -Ps cn Ol 00Ol -si
-sj
cn o CD Ol oo cn CD 4*. Ol CD 00 Ol Ol Ol o Ol 00 CD Ol 00 cn
m
H IAI D l- X IAI o 00 c_ D m H 70 H z 70 TJ O l- c_ D
D D D D D D D D a D D
O D D O O a o O a O D O D O o D o D D D o D O
t i  <z> in
Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl Tl 
Tl "0 T) "0 "0 "0
D D
T 1 T 1 T | T 1 T I T I T I T I T | T 1 ^ T | T I T I T I ^ T 1 T | T 1 T I T I T | T 1
r n m T J T J T J T J T J T J T J T J ^ T J T J T J T J ^ m T J T J T J T J T J T J
CO | \3 —»■ l\3 — CO -i- -»■ | sj  .p*
| ' O - ^ - l > J ( O l O ( D - i ( D > J C O O O 0 O C O S - i N ) S Oc o w o - ^ c o a i ^ f f i c o r o c D C o o o h o c o c o h o a i o c D oo-P>--f^O' vi4^^-^cno r o - ^ o o r o m - ^ o i - ^
O O i - r - O O O i - O r - r - O O i - O i - O O i - O O O O O O r - O i - O r -
-sjcn
's i  CD cn ro
oo
00
4^ . o z z z z z z z z z z 0000 z z -sjOl O z Z
o '
o
s °o '
s?o '
s$
o '
O
sO
o '
00 Ol Ol CD cn 00 CD 00 00 Ol 00 ~sj 00 00 cn
CD cn M cn z cn CD -Ps cn CD -sj -sj 00 Ol Ol
s°o ' N°o ' x°o ' s °o '
sO
O'
sO
o ' s °o ' s °o '
sO
O '
sO
o ' s?o ' sOo ' s?o ' s?o ' ■s?O'
O)
CD
-sj-sj oocn
N  Ol O) CD 00 O)oo oo o  o  cn
-sj -sj ~sj ~sj -sj -sj -sj Ol ~sj -sj -sj -sj ~sj Ol -sj -sj -si -si oo -sj -sj Ol ~sj Ol 00 -sj -sj -sj -sj -sj
4^ 4^ ~sj 00 4^ cn M CD M M Ol -sj cn 00 CD M Ol M O Ol 00 -sj Ol — O CD Ol 01 -sj 00
s°o '
sOo ' sOo ' s°o ' s?o '
sOo ' sOo ' s?o ' ■s?O ' S?o '
sOo ' sOo ' s?o ' s?o '
sO
o ' s °o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sOo ' s°o ' s °o ' s°o ' sPo '
sOo '
sOo ' sPo ' N°o ' s?o ' s?o ' s?o '
cn Ol Ol Ol Ol Ol 4*. Ol cn cn 4^
fO M 4^ —^ —i. Ol Ol Ol IO -sj Ol
'So ' 'Oo ' sOo ' 'So ' 'So ' s$o ' 'Oo ' s°o ' 'Oo '
sOo ' sOo '
CD 00 00 CD CD “7 CD CD 0 CD 00
~s| —^ 00 O l Ol Z . 4*. Ol 0 O O
s°
o ' 'Oo ' s?o ' SPo ' sOo ' 'Oo ' 'So ' s°o '
s °o ' s°o '
CD 00 CD 00 —-y O l CD -sj -sj
4^ 00 -Ps O O l z Ol Ol O CD
s°o ' 'Oo ' s °o '
o
'Po '
s °o ' 'Po '
__I
sO
o '
sO
o ' s?o '
s °
o '
Olo 'siOl Ol-sj o 00Ol Z 00O z z O z
s°
o '
sP
o ' 'So '
o
s °o '
SP
o '
sPo '
O
s°
o '
cn 4^- cn o  o  oo
o  - z .  Z  o  ?- ?-
Ol Ol cn 4^ 4^ cn Ol cn cn cn cn cn cn O l Ol
O -Ps 4*. -sj -sj 00 M 4^ Ol o —^ Ol O l -sj O
sO
o ' sOo ' 'So '
sO
o '
sO
o ' s°o ' s °o ' S°o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
CD CD CD -sj -sj -sj Ol CD 00 CD 00 CD
-sj O O Ol -sj CD cn cn fS M 00 CD -sj Ol -P>
SP
o '
O
sOo ' s$o '
■sSo '
s °o ' s °o ' s °o ' s °o '
\rn~J
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
o
o
00 Ol CD 00 cn 00 CD ~sl CD -sj CD -sj
4^ O 00 ~sl Ol o M -sj cn M 00 Ol
s°o '
O
so
o '
■s?o ' SPo '
sO
o '
^ >
sO
o '
nPo '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
sO
o '
cno O cno -sj00 oQ Ol~sl
sO
o ' sOo '
sO
o '
sO
o ' sOo '
sPo '
f - s  /—v 00 ^ ,— * Ol O)2 ^ - 2 o ) S S s m  O  ^  O  ~o O  O  . o
00 00 00 Ol CD cn cn cn CD cn 00 Ol ->i <3? -si 00 -si CO Ol 00 -si 01 ■si 00 -S| Ol
00 co cn O ->i 00 o M o 00 CD CD cn 00 CO CO o CD CO 00
s? 5? 3? 3? s?o' s?o' 3? 3? 3? 'So' 3? 'So' 3? 'So' 3? 3? 'So' sPo' 'So' 3? 3? 3? sSo' sSo' S'So' sSo' S'So'
m m m m m m m m m m C/l m m m m C/l C/l ce
cn w M -s| CO M Ol _N) ro N) _v ro r o Cl ro ro cn ro ro Cl ro Cl Cl cn r o ro
CD
CD
cn
CD
cn
M
CD-si
CD
Ol -vl 00 "co cn Vi Cl CO To To CO _ i. "■Ps o —k- CO CD o —»■ O C l To C l
r°
CO
M i t
CD
ro CD cn
00
cn cn
C l
C l
-sj
cn
-Ps
ro o
-sj
00
C l
4^
-si 4^-Ps cor°
CD
oo
C l
cn
00-P^ 0000 CD-Ps CDC l C l C l' j
cn
00
CD
Ol
cn
CD
00 C l cn CO b i Ki b i 00 V CD Li. CD V V b i 00 o C l 00 ‘■P^ V C l ro 4^ 4*. C l
Ol -si C l 00 o o 00 o CD C l o -P* -si —1 C l -si -si ro 4^ o C l
PCP ID
Last Name
First Initial
Degree
Specialty
A verage Panel Size
A ccepting New M em bers
Childhoom Im m unizations
B reast C ancer S creeing
Cervical C ancer Screeing
Formulary C om pliance
G eneric Rate
Ability to  m ake an  appo in tm en t
Satisfaction with PCP
Advice to  Q uit Sm oling
*CP Final Score
PCP Paym ent Earned
61
Tl Tl 
Ol  CD 
CD l\5
xj cn 
o  o
T
cn
cn
05
_  K> M W 
cn  oo 05
0 T T T T T TJ Tl T T T T T Tl Tl T) Tl Tl Tl T T T T T T "0—v 05 -0 05 -0 05 CO 05 cn cn CO CD 05 05 cn 05 05 05 x j 05 05 05 CD cn 05o -Pi- CD cn CD cn CO o CD CD CO l\5 cn 05 CD 00 05 O -Pi -Pi O O -Pi CD cn—1 05 O co O CO 05 -Pi x l CD 05 CD co -•J CD O x j cn o 05 O 00 -Pi x l COCO "-I CO co co CO x l
2
o CO o 05 co oo CD -Pi 00 CO x l x l x j ro cn 05 CO
o
■"-I O x i 05 CO 05 CO l\5 x l -Pi 00 O 05 co CO CD
CO
-Pi cn -Pi cn
- ^ O O Z ^ r > c D [ T l C 0 O ^ > J H ^ ^ > ^ c D r 0 ] D ^ C / ) O O
d O d O d o O d d d d d d d d d d d o o d d o o d d o o o o
^ T | T | -O T | “n T I “n ^ - n T | T l T I T I T l ^ -n -n T l " n T I ^ T | " n T l T I  =  T I -n -n ^ > T T m T T T T ^ T T T J T T T ^ “D T 3 T T I " D ^ T " D T T ^ " D m m
l\5 _ i . _ i . _ i . _ i .  ->■ ->■WMO5 O5 4 ^ OCDOO^ O5 ^ O5 COr OJ i . Mr OCOW' MWS ( D( Dr OM0 NJ N) «( D M ^ O i O W W ^ C O r O W - ^ O O ^ O i W U l O M O S C D O i r O t D W O l N O D
O O r ~ r * i  O O O i  i O  i i i O  i O O i -  O O O O O O
z z z z z z z
co
CD
<D
Z z 05O z 0005 -Xlcn z 0505 00CO 00O 00_x CDO 00o z
v °ffX s ° X®ffx x °0s x °ffx s °tfX x$ffx xOffx xO0s
cn 05 05 x l 05 05 cn 05 ■Xl ■xl Xj CO CO CO
05 x l 05 cn cn CD o 00 05 ■xl 00 o l\3 cn
S°cT-* sOo ' xOO i xPoN xPoN xP0 s xPoN xPoN xPoN xPO ' xPox xPoN xPCfx ■xp0s
x jl\3 CDl\3
cn  05 x j  x j 
CD W  M
■xl ■Xl Xj ■Xl ■Xl ■xl 05 xj ■xl ■Xl Xj Xj CO ■Xl xj Xl
O CO 00 ■Xl O ■Xl —i cn CO cn -Pi l\5 -Pi 05 CO ■Xl
xPO' xP0 s xPCfx xP0s xPtfx xOQXx xp0 s xP0 s xp0 s xP0 s xpoX xP0 s xPoX
xO
ox
xO
o'- xPoN
cn cn cn 05 -pi -Pi cn cn -Pi cn cn -Pi -Pi -Pi -Pi -Pi
cn o o —i ■Xl 05 o 05 CO i\ j 05 Xj ■Xl CD CD CO
xO
0 s
Xp
ffX s °ffX
xOffx x °ffx x°0 s x °OX xPo ' s? xP xPoN xPoX xPoX xPoN xPoX xOO'-
■Xl CO CD CD CO CO CD CD CD 00 CD 05v—? l\5 -Pi v—? v—? v—? N5 05 05 cn O l\5 ■xl CD
Xp
0 s
v—?
Xp
QX
xP
0 s
xO
o '
v—? 
x °O '
x°O '
v—? 
x°Qx
v—? 
xPQx
xP
0s
xP
O '
xOcX x °cX x °o ' x°O ' x°O ' x °o '
05 co -Pi. cn 4  ^ 05 cn -1^ 
o
o  o  o  
o  o  o
xj
CO
cn ■Xl CO 00 CO -Pi 00 CD CO CD CD 00 CD 05 CD CO "7 CO o CD ■7 cn CD CD 0005 cn CO x l 05 cn cn O cn l\5 O -Pi l\3 cn x j 00 05 V_1o CO o CO Ol OxO
O '
xO
O '
xO
o ' xPo '
xO
o ' tfx xPqX xPqX xPqX x ?o ' --Oo ' x °o ' x °o ' x °o '
x$
o ' X?cX xPo '
V_1
xPo '
x$
O '
•P
o ' xPqX x °o ' xPo '
05 cn 
o  o o  o  o  o
05xl X l X joo cn 00 CO O CO o  o  o  o
CO
CO o  o  o  o
o  Z  
Q
cn 05
O  x j
cn -Pi —i po ~>iCO O  05 O  co
w  IO  05 ^  CD
O  05 CO CO oS  00  M  00 05
CO cn cn xl 05 cn 05 05 cn
05 xl o CD -Pi 05 •Pi CD 05
xPo' 5* 5? 5? 3* 3? 5? 3? 3?
C/5 C/5 C/5 C/5 C/5 C/5 C/5 C/5 C/5
N) CO N> N) CO CO
“-Pi “-Pi 00 ~_i CO “co “-Pi
CO x j CO 05 CD -pi x l
CO 00 00 05 05 CO CD —1
05 CD CO 05 x l ho L i Xl
O 05 x l 05 CO CO cn ro
oo co oo cn o> cn —^ 05 cn xi co xi -4 "J O  CD ■UCO 00 05 o
-Pi _
cn - i  
co  o
l\5 co
05 N5 -pi 
“-Pi CD 
x l CD 
-Pi CD
co co cn 
cn oo o
o
oco
05
l\3 l\3
o  N) cn oo cn
oo
05 cn co 
o  cn - i
CD l\J
X j-PiCD 
cn 05
x i ho cn M M W
co ro ro
CO O  "xj
05 cn co 
05 CD CD
cn cd
-Pi - i
PCP ID
L ast N am e
First Initial
D egree
Sp ec ia lty
A verage P an e l S ize
A ccep ting  New M em b ers
C h ildhoom  Im m u n iza tio n s
B reas t C a n c e r  S c re e in g
C ervical C a n c e r  S c re e in g
Form ulary  C o m p lia n ce
S e n e ric  R ate
Ability to  m ak e  a n  a p p o in tm e n t
S a tis fac tio n  w ith PC P
Advice to  Q uit S m o lin g
JCP Final S c o re
PC P P a y m en t E arn ed
6 2
